

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 310500  
ORIGIN NODS-00

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DRAFTED BY PM/SSP: RMANTEL  
APPROVED BY PM - MR. GELB  
EUR/SOV - MR. MATTHEWS  
S/S:JETHYDEN

-----044162 302157Z /62

R 302128Z DEC 77 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
INFO WHITE HOUSE

S E C R E T STATE 310500

NODIS  
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM GELB; WHITE HOUSE FOR BRZEZINSKI

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS PCAT, UR

SUBJ: "NON-PAPER" ON US-SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ARMS  
TRANSFER TALKS

1. AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH KHLESTOV  
AND TRANSMIT TO HIM PERSONALLY, ON BEHALF OF GELB,  
TEXT OF "NON-PAPER" THAT SUMMARIZES US PRESENTATION  
TO SOVIETS DURING TALKS.

2. PURPOSE OF "NON-PAPER" IS TO PROVIDE ON AN UNOFFICIAL  
BUT WRITTEN BASIS CENTRAL THRUST OF US PRESENTATION.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

US-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON LIMITATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL  
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ARMS TRADE  
THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE PRELIMINARY MEETING  
ON THIS SUBJECT, HELD IN WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 14  
THROUGH 19, 1977, WAS AN IMPORTANT AND USEFUL STEP  
TOWARD IMPROVING OUR MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF THIS  
COMPLEX TOPIC.

MUTUAL INTERESTS

THE US AND USSR HAVE MANY PARALLEL IF NOT COMMON INTERESTS IN RESTRAINING CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS. THE US HAS TAKEN THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE BY ADOPTING A POLICY OF RESTRAINT IN ITS OWN ARMS SALES. THIS EFFORT HAS THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT CARTER. MEASURES TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT THIS NEW POLICY OF RESTRAINT WERE DESCRIBED BY THE US REPRESENTATIVES AT THE DECEMBER MEETING.

AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, HOWEVER, THE US ABILITY TO SUSTAIN ITS RESTRAINT POLICY DEPENDS, IN PART, ON THE DEMONSTRATION OF PROGRESS TOWARD RESTRAINT BY OTHER SUPPLIERS, INCLUDING THE USSR. WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, THE PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUING US RESTRAINT ARE UNCERTAIN.

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT US-SOVIET COOPERATION IN RESTRAINING ARMS TRANSFERS IS AS IMPORTANT AS THE MOST IMPORTANT OTHER ITEMS ON OUR ARMS CONTROL AGENDA; FURTHER, THAT TALKS ON CONTROLLING THE ARMS TRADE FALL WITHIN THE SPIRIT AND CONTEXT OF THE MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS WE ASSUMED WHEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES SIGNED, AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, THE "BASIC PRINCIPLES  
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OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR," ON MAY 29, 1972.

OUR COMMON INTEREST IN RESTRAINING ARMS TRANSFERS HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED IN THE PAST WHEN SITUATIONS DEVELOPED IN WHICH OUR RESPECTIVE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO OPPOSING SIDES IN LOCAL CONFLICTS LED TO TENSIONS IN OUR OWN RELATIONS, AND ADVERSELY INFLUENCED THE POLITICAL CLIMATE FOR PROGRESS IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. OTHER IMPORTANT COMMON STAKES IN ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINT INCLUDE:

--PREVENTION AND/OR LIMITATION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS:  
UNRESTRICTED ARMS TRANSFERS COULD HELP SPARK DANGEROUS AND DESTABILIZING LOCAL CONFLICTS, PERHAPS DRAWING US INADVERTENTLY INTO UNWANTED AND DANGEROUS CONFRONTATIONS.

--ASSISTING EFFORTS TO STEM NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION:  
UNRESTRAINED TRANSFERS OF CONVENTIONAL MILITARY

TECHNOLOGY MIGHT GRADUALLY UNDERMINE OUR COOPERATIVE

EFFORTS TO STEM NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, THROUGH STATES  
OPTING FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO OFFSET CHANGES IN LOCAL  
BALANCES OF CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES RESULTING  
FROM ARMS TRANSFERS.

--AVOIDING MANIPULATION BY RECIPIENTS:

THE US AND USSR SHOULD AIM TO AVOID SITUATIONS  
IN WHICH RECIPIENTS OF OUR ARMS MIGHT BE TEMPTED  
TO PLAY US OFF AGAINST ONE ANOTHER.

--REDUCING SUPPLIER UNCERTAINTIES:

FUTURE POLICIES OF OUR ARMS RECIPIENTS ARE NOT  
PREDICTABLE, ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIPS OFTEN PROVE  
TO BE OF ONLY LIMITED POLITICAL VALUE.

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--REDUCING COSTLY AND UNNECESSARY WEAPON ACQUISITIONS:

THE US AND USSR SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE USE OF  
SCARCE FINANCIAL RESOURCES IN THE THIRD WORLD  
FOR MORE CONSTRUCTIVE PURPOSES THAN ARMS ACQUISITIONS.

--ENCOURAGING OTHER SUPPLIERS TO RESTRAIN ARMS EXPORTS:

ANY US-SOVIET UNDERSTANDINGS ON RESTRAINT CANNOT  
BE FULLY EFFECTIVE WITHOUT PARALLEL ACTION BY OTHER  
SUPPLIERS. YET, AS THE TWO LARGEST SUPPLIERS, OUR  
COOPERATION IS NECESSARY AS AN EXAMPLE TO OTHERS.

MUTUAL APPROACHES TO RESTRAINT

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT COMMON ACCEPTANCE OF  
THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA WOULD CONSTITUTE A FIRST  
STEP TOWARD COOPERATION:

--THERE SHOULD BE NO ADVANTAGE FOR ANY SUPPLIER;

--THE FULFILLMENT OF RECIPIENTS' LEGITIMATE SECURITY  
REQUIREMENTS MUST NOT BE JEOPARDIZED;

--ANY STEPS TOWARD COOPERATION MUST BE FLEXIBLE,  
AND REFLECT BOTH OUR COMMON CONCERNS AND RESPECTIVE  
NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

THE LONDON NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS' GROUP MAY BE A RELEVANT  
PRECEDENT. THERE, THE EMERGENCE OF HARMONIZED  
NATIONAL GUIDELINES WAS THE MOST USEFUL RESULT. WE  
COULD STRIVE FOR SIMILAR HARMONIZATION IN ARMS  
TRANSFER RESTRAINT.

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POSSIBLE FORMS WHICH SUCH RESTRAINT GUIDELINES  
MIGHT TAKE INCLUDE:

--ADVANCED SYSTEMS RESTRAINT:

INTRODUCTION OF ADVANCED WEAPON SYSTEMS INTO A  
REGION WHERE THEY HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN DEPLOYED  
COULD ENDANGER PEACE AND STABILITY BY CREATING A  
SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER COMBAT CAPABILITY IN THE AREA.  
GUIDELINES COULD BE DISCUSSED CONCERNING THE  
DEFINITION OF "ADVANCED SYSTEMS" IN SPECIFIC  
REGIONS OF THE WORLD.

--LIMITATIONS ON SELECTED WEAPONS:

CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF WEAPONS, FOR A VARIETY OF  
REASONS, ARE ALMOST ALWAYS INHERENTLY DESTABILIZING,  
AND SUSCEPTIBLE TO MISUSE BY CRIMINALS AND TERRORISTS.  
DISCUSSIONS OF GUIDELINES WHICH WOULD LIMIT THE  
SPREAD OF SUCH WEAPONS APPEARS TO BE IN OUR MUTUAL  
INTEREST. MAN-PORTABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS ARE  
ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE TYPE OF WEAPONS SYSTEM THAT  
MIGHT BE LIMITED.

--CO-PRODUCTION RESTRICTIONS:

BOTH THE US AND USSR HAVE ENTERED INTO AGREEMENTS  
WITH THIRD COUNTRIES FOR THE CO-PRODUCTION OR  
LICENSED PRODUCTION OF SOME IMPORTANT WEAPON  
SYSTEMS. PROBLEMS WHICH ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH  
CO-PRODUCTION INCLUDE THE TRANSFER OF IMPORTANT  
TECHNOLOGY TO THE CO-PRODUCER AND THE POSSIBLE  
EXPORT BY THE CO-PRODUCER OF SURPLUS PRODUCTION.  
CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE GIVEN TO GUIDELINES WHICH  
WOULD CALL FOR FOREGOING CO-PRODUCTION ARRANGEMENTS  
WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FOR SIGNIFICANT WEAPONS  
OR COMPONENTS OF MAJOR WEAPONS.

--RETRANSFER CONTROLS:

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AS WITH NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, FAILURE TO ADOPT  
TIGHT RETRANSFER CONTROLS COULD LEAD TO CIRCUMVENTION  
OF ARMS RESTRAINT, THEREBY UNDERMINING SOVIET-  
AMERICAN INTEREST IN AVOIDING THE DANGERS AND  
DESTABILIZING CONSEQUENCES OF PARTICULAR ARMS  
TRANSFERS. IT MAY BE IN BOTH OUR INTEREST TO ASSURE  
THAT WEAPONS EITHER OF US MIGHT SUPPLY NOT BE

RETRANSFERRED WITHOUT OUR APPROVAL.

CEILINGS

ALTHOUGH THE US WOULD NOT TOTALLY RULE OUT ANY APPROACH AT THIS POINT, IT IS NOT OUR INTENTION TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF ARMS EACH COUNTRY SHOULD SELL. THE DIFFERENT REQUIREMENTS OF FRIENDS AND ALLIES OF EACH SUPPLIER WOULD MAKE NEGOTIATION OF OVERALL CEILINGS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. IN OUR VIEW, THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON RESTRAINT GUIDELINES FOR CERTAIN KINDS OF WEAPONS AND REGIONS WOULD AVE A MORE DIRECT IMPACT IN REDUCING THE RISK OF REGIONAL CONFLICT AND THE DANGER OF US-SOVIET CONFRONTATION.

SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD)

OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER ISSUE AT THE SSOD BECAUSE OF OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AS MAJOR SUPPLIERS AND OUR NEED TO RESPOND CREDIBLY TO CRITICS ABOUT OUR INTENTION TO RESTRAIN ARMS TRANSFERS. ALTHOUGH THE PROBLEM CAN NOT BE SOLVED BY ANY SINGLE STATE OR GROUP OF STATES, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR THE US AND USSR TO CONSIDER CONSULTATIONS WITH REGARD TO  
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THIS ISSUE PRIOR TO THE SSOD.

NEED FOR ONGOING CONSULTATIONS

THE GREAT NUMBER OF MUTUAL INTERESTS AND PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINT ISSUE STRONGLY SUGGEST THE NEED FOR ONGOING SOVIET-AMERICAN CONSULTATIONS.

FURTHER TALKS WOULD PRESENT AN OPPORTUNITY FOR BOTH SIDES TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE POLICY GUIDELINES AND SPECIFIC RESTRAINT MEASURES IN GREATER DETAIL. WE ALSO ANTICIPATE THE SOVIET UNION MAY WISH TO DISCUSS FURTHER ITS POLICIES AND PRACTICES DURING FUTURE SESSIONS. FINALLY, A CONTINUATION OF THIS DIALOGUE WILL PROVIDE US WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK ABOUT TRANSFERS CONTEMPLATED BY EITHER SIDE WHICH MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO MISINTERPRETATION BY THE OTHER SIDE.

THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO ACCOMMODATE THE LEGITIMATE DEFENSE NEEDS OF RECIPIENTS WHILE INVOLVING THEM

IN THE RESTRAINT PROCESS IS ALSO ONE WHICH WE HAVE  
NOT FULLY ADDRESSED. ONE WAY TO INVOLVE RECIPIENTS

MIGHT BE THROUGH REGIONAL APPROACHES TO RESTRAINT.  
ADDITIONAL CONSULTATIONS ON THIS ISSUE WOULD BE  
PARTICULARLY USEFUL IN PREPARATION FOR THE SSOD.

IN SUMMARY, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT FUTURE  
TALKS ON THESE QUESTIONS ARE VERY IMPORTANT AND  
WOULD HELP TO MAKE CLEAR OUR MUTUAL STAKES IN  
COOPERATION TO PREVENT FURTHER ESCALATION OF  
THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRADE. CHRISTOPHER

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